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In this paper, a lightweight attribute-based security scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is proposed for fog-enabled
cyber physical systems (Fog-CPS). A novel aspect of the proposed scheme is that the communication between Fog-CPS entities is
secure even when the certification authority (CA) is compromised. This is achieved by dividing the attributes into two sets, namely,
secret and shared, and subsequently generating two key pairs, referred to as the partial and final key pairs, for each entity of the Fog-
CPS system. Unlike existing attribute-based encryption (ABE) and identity-based encryption schemes, in the proposed scheme,
each entity calculates the final public key of the communicating CPS devices without the need of generating and transmitting
digital certificates. Moreover, the proposed security scheme considers an efficient and secure key pair update approach in which
the calculation overhead is limited to one group element. To show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, we have calculated
and compared the memory and processing complexity with other bilinear and elliptic curve schemes. We have also
implemented our scheme in a Raspberry Pi (3B+ model) for CPS simulations. The proposed scheme guarantees the
confidentiality, integrity, privacy, and authenticity in Fog-CPS systems.
1. Introduction
Fog computing can improve the monitoring and manage-
ment of next-generation cyber physical systems (CPS). A
general fog-enabled cyber physical system (Fog-CPS) as
shown in Figure 1 consists of three layers, namely, the CPS
device, fog, and cloud. Fog-CPS systems are vulnerable to
numerous security, privacy, and trust challenges. With
regard to security, different attacks, namely, interception,
interruption,modification, fabrication, unauthorized authen-
tication, and access, can be carried out to disrupt the commu-
nication between Fog-CPS entities. The abovementioned
challenges could be addressed by employing lightweight cryp-
tographic techniques. However, the existing solutions have a
number of limitations. Firstly, in public key encryption
(PKE) schemes, the generation, verification, and distribution
of certificates incur extra computation and communication
overhead which is not desirable for resource-limited CPS
devices. Secondly, in attribute-based encryption (ABE)
schemes, there is a certification authority (CA) which gener-
ates the secret keys based on a set of attributes. However, the
compromise of CA can endanger the secret keys and therefore
the secrecy of encrypted messages. Thirdly, the existing ABE
schemes which are based on bilinear pairing require large
security parameters and therefore are not suitable for
resource-constrained CPS devices.
Considering the limitations of existing solutions, in this
paper, a lightweight security scheme is proposed. The pro-
posed scheme guarantees that the communication between
entities is secure in cases where the CAmight be compromised.
1.1. Motivation. The motivation for designing such a solution
comes from the identity-based encryption (IBE) and ABE
schemes as it is believed that inherent attributes of CPS
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devices can be used for identification, authentication, and
access control. From here onwards, the proposed scheme is
called as Fog-CPS.
Moreover, in the proposed scheme, the CA (i.e., FA in
this case) cannot decrypt the messages exchanged among
CPS devices, thus maintaining their privacy. This is
achieved by dividing the attribute set A into two subsets,
a secret AS and a shared AK attribute subset. Precisely,
each entity in a Fog-CPS system will have two key pairs,
namely, a “partial key pair” and a “final key pair” gener-
ated from secret AS and shared AK attribute sets, respec-
tively. The secret AS attributes are only known to FA
which registers the entities and generates the partial key
pair. The registration of CPS entities with FA ensures that
published public keys are authentic and do not require any
further verification.
However, as the secret AS attributes are only known to
FA; the other collaborating CPS devices cannot verify
them. To address this problem, a notion of “shared” AK
attributes is introduced. The shared AK attributes are
known to collaborating Fog-CPS entities which generate
the final public and secret keys. The encryption and
decryption would take place using final public and secret
keys. Such an approach is advantageous for two reasons:
(1) the secret AS attributes are only shared with the FA
and the leakage of partial secret keys would not risk the
communication of collaborating entities and (2) the
scheme is scalable because the final public keys are gener-
ated by the collaborating devices themselves without the
aid of FA. Any device can generate the final public keys
of other devices.
Furthermore, upon key update, the key regeneration pro-
cess is lightweight, since the key generation process as found
in Algorithms 1–3 is not repeated.
1.2. Contributions. The contributions of this paper are
enumerated below:
(1) First, a lightweight attribute-based security scheme is
proposed for Fog-CPS systems
(2) Second, the Fog-CPS scheme considers an efficient
and secure key pair update approach in which the
calculation overhead is limited to one group element
(3) Third, the proposed scheme is compared with
other schemes based on bilinear pairing and elliptic
curves by calculating its memory and processing
overhead
(4) Fourth, the proposed scheme is implemented on a
resource-limited Raspberry Pi (3B+ model) for CPS
simulations.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as fol-
lows: the related work is discussed in Section 2. The proposed
scheme is presented in Section 3. Next, the experimental
results are presented in Section 4. The conclusion and future
work are discussed in Section 5.
2. Related Work
To secure the communication in CPS systems, the literature
adopts a hybrid approach in which both symmetric (AES-
based) and asymmetric (RSA-based and ABE) encryption
techniques are used. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
is used to encrypt the communication between sensor nodes
and the gateway, whereas the asymmetric schemes are used
to encrypt the communication between the gateway and the
service provider.
Fog layer
Cloud layer
Fog node 1 Fog node 2 Fog node 3 Fog node 4
CPS device layer Smart building
device
Smart factory
device
Smart car
Smart watch
Smart home
device
FA FA FA FA
Figure 1: Fog-enabled cyber physical systems (Fog-CPS).
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Recently, Mahmood et al. [1] propose an authentication
scheme for a smart grid. The scheme has a few limitations:
(1) the scalability in case of large-scale CPS systems with
hundreds of nodes and (2) the inconsideration of access con-
trol mechanism. In a smart grid system, there are several
heterogeneous devices at different layers, so including access
control mechanisms is crucial. Kocabas et al. [2] present a
medical cloud-assisted CPS architecture consisting of acqui-
sition, preprocessing, cloud, and action layers. The study pro-
poses an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) symmetric
key encryption scheme for communication between the
acquisition and preprocessing layers. The main disadvantage
of [2] is the key management of symmetric keys in such a
complex environment with hundreds of CPS devices. Shuo
et al. [3] propose a distributed authentication framework
for the multidomain M2M environment. The proposed
framework employs a hybrid encryption scheme involving
IBE and AES symmetric encryption.
Sravani et al. [4] present a signature-based authenticated
key establishment scheme for IoT applications. Hu et al. [5]
1: Input: Security parameter λ, secret attribute set AS.
2: Output:PKAS /SKAS
PKAS = fG, Pi,H1g, ∀i = 0, 1,⋯, t.
SKAS = fsg:
3: Choose elliptic curve group G, where P is a base point on the elliptic curve Epða, bÞ defined over the finite field Zp.
4: Choose a one-way collision resistance hash function, H1 defined as:
H1 : f0, 1g∗→ Z∗p :
5: Create a secret random number r ∈ Zp.
6: Map t < n attributes in secret set As to Zp using hash function H1 and compute secret number s.
si =H1ðiÞðmod pÞ, ∀i ∈AS, ð1Þ
s´ =∑ti=1si,ð2Þs = rs´:ð3Þ
7: Next, compute public key components Pi as:
Pi = siP, ∀i = 0, 1, ::⋯ , t: ð4Þ
Algorithm 1: Partial key pair generation.
1: Input: Public Key PKAS and shared attribute set AK .
2: Output:PKAK = fUig, ∀i = 0, 1,⋯, t.
3: Let AK = a1a2 ⋯ :at be the device attribute string over shared attribute set.
4: Map t < n attributes in shared set AK to Zp using hash function H1 and compute k.
ki =H1ðiÞðmod pÞ, ∀i ∈AK , ð5Þ
k =∑ti=1ki: ð6Þ
5: Next, compute final public key components Ui, ∀i = 0, 1,⋯, t as:
Ui = kiPi:ð7Þ
Algorithm 2: Final public key generation.
1: Input: Secret key SKAS and shared attribute set AK .
2: Output:SKAK = fu1g.
3: Compute secret number α as follows:
α = sk,ð8Þ
where s is the secret key component from SKAS and k is computed similar to Equation (6) in Algorithm 2.
4: Next, compute Equation (9), f ðα,AKÞ which is a t-degree at most polynomial in Zp½x.
f ðα,AKÞ =
Qt
i=1ðα +H1ðiÞÞ1−ai :ð9Þ
5: Pick two random numbers ru, tu ∈ ZP . Compute su such that the following condition holds.
1/f ðα,AKÞ = su − rutu ðmod pÞ,
su = ð1/f ðα,AKÞÞ + rutu: ð10Þ
6: Next, compute secret key component u1
u1 = su − rutu ðmod pÞ:ð11Þ
Algorithm 3: Final secret key generation.
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propose a communication architecture for Body Area Net-
works (BANs) and design a scheme to secure the data com-
munication between wearable sensors and data consumers
(doctors and nurses). They propose the CP-ABE and
signature-based schemes to store the encrypted data at the
data sink. Guo et al. [6] propose a CP-ABE scheme with
constant-size decryption keys. Chen et al. [7] propose fully
secure KP-ABE and CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts
and a fully secure ABS with constant-size signatures. Odelu
and Das [8] propose a lightweight and constant-size secret
key ABE scheme based on ECC. However, key update/revo-
cation and key generation are some of the limitations of the
scheme in [8].
A major limitation of the existing ABE schemes [5, 7, 9,
10, 11, 12] is the complexity; these schemes require large
security parameters (i.e., 1024- or 2048-bit size). Besides that,
in the above cited ABE schemes, CA generates and distrib-
utes the secret keys. Nonetheless, sharing of private attributes
with CA can risk the privacy, since the CA can also decrypt
messages and retrieve CPS system data. Moreover, the com-
promise of CA can also risk the secrecy of communication
between the sender and receiver. Additionally, some studies
propose symmetric key schemes for resource-constrained
devices. However, in large-scale Fog-CPS systems, the sym-
metric key management process becomes very complicated
and complex. Symmetric schemes require a separate protocol
for session key agreement and generation. Furthermore,
when the short-size data is encrypted with a symmetric key,
then the information which is revealed about the key may
be critical for ciphertext-only attack.
Henceforth, it is believed a lightweight encryption
scheme based on ECC wherein the CA only generates the
partial key pair is the appropriate choice. ECC-based
schemes require smaller security parameters (i.e., 128 or
256 bits) and therefore can be implemented in resource-
limited CPS devices.
3. Proposed Fog-CPS Security Scheme
In this section, the proposed Fog-CPS scheme is presented.
Table 1 lists the notations used throughout the paper.
3.1. Preliminaries. In this section, the attributes, access struc-
tures, and the computational hard problems are discussed.
3.1.1. Secret and Shared Attribute Sets. All CPS devices and
fog nodes possess a set of attributes. Let A =AS ∪AK be the
attribute set of each CPS device consisting of both secret AS
and shared AK attributes. As an example, a few attributes
for both sets are listed in Table 2.
3.1.2. Access Structure. The attribute string of a device is pre-
sented with an n-bit string a1a2 ⋯ an. To further elaborate
the attribute string, the example of shared attribute set AK
is considered. The attribute string is defined as follows: ai =
1, if Ai ∈AK and ai = 0, if Ai ∉AK . For example, if n = 5 and
4 attributes are considered for final key pair generation, then
AK = fA1, A2, A4, A5g; the 5-bit string AK becomes 11011.
Likewise, an access policy is defined by ℙ and specified with
attributes in the shared attribute set AK . The access policy
is also represented with n-bit string b1b2 ⋯ bn where bi = 1,
Table 1: Notation table.
Notation Description
λ Security parameter
p A sufficiently large prime number
Ep a, bð Þ An elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b mod pð Þ defined over the finite field Zp ; Zp = 0, 1,⋯, p − 1f g
P A base point in Ep a, bð Þ
xP Scalar multiplication, PϵEp a, bð Þ
P +Q Elliptic curve point addition
G Elliptic curve group generated by P
H1ðÞ One-way collision resistance hash functions
A Device attribute set
AS Secret attribute set
AK Shared attribute set
ℙ Access policy, ℙ ⊆AK
Pi,Ui Public key components
PKAS /SKAS Public and secret key pair generated from AS
PKAK /SKAK Public and secret keys generated from AK
u1 Final secret key components
CT Ciphertext
Z∗p Finite field over p
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for Ai ∈ ℙ, and bi = 0, for Ai ∉ℙ. If the access policy is defined
on attributes fA1, A2, A4g, then the policy string is ℙ = 11010
. Additionally, the proposed scheme is based on the AND-
gate access control structure. The attribute set AK fulfills
the access policy ℙ, if and only if ℙ ⊆A and ai ≥ bi, for all
i = 1, 2,⋯, n.
3.1.3. Computational Hard Problems. The security of the Fog-
CPS scheme is based on the computational problems
described below.
(1) q-Generalized Diffie-Hellman (q-GDH) Assumption [13].
Given a1P, a2P,⋯, aqP in G and all the subset products
ðQiϵSaiÞP ∈G for any strict subset S ⊂ f1,⋯, qg, it is hard
to compute ða1 ⋯ aqÞP ∈G, where P is a base point in
Epða, bÞ ; a1, a2,⋯, aq ∈ Z∗p . Since the number of subset prod-
ucts (elliptic curve scalar point multiplications) is exponen-
tial in q, access to all these subset products is provided
through an oracle. For a vector a = ða1,⋯, aqÞ ∈ ðZpÞq, define
Op,a to be an oracle that for any strict subset S ⊂ f1,⋯, qg
responds with Op,aðSÞ = ðΠi∈SaiÞ ∈G.
Definition 1 (q-GDH assumption). The ðt, q,∈Þ − GDH
assumption is satisfied in G, if for all t-time algorithms A,
the advantage AdvGDHA,q = Pr ½AOP,a = ða1 ⋯ aqÞP < ϵ, where
a = ða1,⋯, aqÞ ∈ ðZpÞq and for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0
.(2) q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-DHI) Problem [13]. Given
a ðq + 1Þ-tuple ðP, xP, x2P,⋯, xqPÞ ∈Gq+1, the problem is to
compute ð1/xÞP ∈G where x ∈ Z∗p .
Definition 2 (q-DHI assumption). G satisfies the ðt, q, ϵÞ
-DHI assumption, if for all t-time algorithmsA , the advantage
becomes AdvGDHA,q = Pr ½AðP, xP, x2P,⋯, xqPÞ = ð1/xÞP < ϵ
for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0, where the probability is over
the random choice of x in Z∗p and the random bits of A .
It can be shown by a reduction that our computational
problem is at least as hard as the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP).
3.2. Assumptions. The following assumptions are made
regarding the Fog-CPS entities.
(1) It is assumed that CPS devices, such as smart meter
and home appliances, can be compromised and leak
sensitive information
(2) The FA, fog nodes, and cloud provider are honest but
curious and might try to gather as much information
(from CPS devices, users, social media, and external
resources) as possible that can later be used to gener-
ate the profile of CPS devices/users. Such information
can be used for targeted advertisement and
spamming
(3) All Fog-CPS entities will register with the FA using
their secret attribute set and it would generate their
partial key pair
(4) The CPS entities and fog nodes generate the final
public keys of the collaborating devices
(5) Access policies based on shared attributes are shared
with CPS devices, FA, fog nodes, and cloud
(6) It is assumed that the elliptic curve group parameters
are preshared with entities
3.3. Fog-CPS Security Scheme Description. The proposed Fog-
CPS security scheme has adopted the encryption and
decryption algorithms of [8]. Furthermore, additional
changes were made to the key generation algorithms of [8]
as specified below:
(1) The attributes in the Fog-CPS scheme are divided
into two sets, i.e., a secretAS and a sharedAK . There-
fore, the key generation process is also distributed
between the FA and Fog-CPS entities. Three algo-
rithms, namely, partial key pair generation, final
public KeyGen, and final secret KeyGen, are designed
for the complete key generation process
(2) The Fog-CPS security scheme uses two elliptic curve
(EC) points for each attribute instead of three as in
[8]. The use of two points per attribute reduces the
processing and memory overhead and makes the
Fog-CPS scheme efficient but also secure.
Table 2: Attributes shared between CPS devices and fog assist node.
(a)
Secret attribute set shared between Fog-CPS entities and FA
A´1 A´2 A´3 … … AS
Device ID IP address Location Malicious activities reported Number of key updates Trust
(b)
Shared attribute set shared between Fog-CPS entities
A1 A2 A3 … … AK
Entity ID Entity type Application ID Application type Data identifier Trust
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(3) Efficient key update algorithms with limited addi-
tional overhead are introduced
3.4. Fog-CPS Security Scheme Construction. The Fog-CPS
security scheme consists of eight algorithms out of which
seven are presented here. As previously mentioned, the
encryption and decryption algorithms are adopted from
[8]. However, we made a few changes to the encryption
algorithm, so it is also presented, but the description of the
decryption algorithm is omitted.
3.4.1. Partial Key Pair Generation ðλ,ASÞ→ PKAS /SKAS . The
partial key pair generation algorithm is executed by the FA
which registers the Fog-CPS entities based on a secret attri-
bute set AS. Algorithm 1 takes as input the security parame-
ter λ and a set of secret attributes AS. λ consists of a long
string of 1 s (chosen finite field) and defines the length of
the secret keys and messages. It outputs the partial public/se-
cret key pair PKAS /SKAS . Subsequently, the FA publishes the
public key PKAS and sends the secret key SKAS to the CPS
device. For initial communication, Fog-CPS entities can use
the partial public keys. The partial public keys guarantee that
Fog-CPS entities are legitimate and registered with FA.
3.4.2. Final Public KeyGen ðPKAS ,AKÞ→ PKAK . The second
pair of keys, namely, the final public and secret keys, is gen-
erated from the shared attribute set. The final public keys
can be generated by any CPS device or fog node that shares
a set of attributes with some other entity. Algorithm 2 gener-
ates the final public key of a CPS device. It takes as input the
partial public key PKAS generated over the secret attribute set
AS and the shared attribute set AK . It outputs the final public
key PKAK .
3.4.3. Final Secret KeyGen ðSKAS ,AKÞ→ SKAK . Algorithm 3
generates the final secret key of a CPS device. It takes as input
the secret key generated over the secret attribute setAS and the
shared attribute set AK . It outputs the final secret key SKAK .
3.4.4. Encrypt ðPKAK ,M,ℙÞ→ CT . The encryption algo-
rithm takes as input the final public key PKAK , access policy
ℙ, and a messageM. It outputs a ciphertext CT. Algorithm 7
7 presents the encryption procedure in detail.
Proposition 3. From Equations (9) and (18), a new polyno-
mial can be calculated as
F x, SK , SPð Þ =
f x, SPð Þ
f x, SKð Þ
=
Yt
i=1
x +H4 ið Þð Þai−bi : ð12Þ
It can easily be verified that f ðx, SPÞ/f ðx, SKÞ is a polyno-
mial function in x, if and only if ℙ ⊆AK . The encryption algo-
rithm and the secret key generation algorithms are designed in
such a way that f ðx, SPÞ/f ðx, SKÞ must be a polynomial for a
successful decryption.
3.4.5. Decrypt ðCT , SKAK Þ→M. The decryption algorithm
takes as input the final secret key SKAK and ciphertext CT
and outputs the plaintext message M. The construction of
the decryption algorithm is the same as the one in [8].
3.4.6. Partial Key Pair Update ðλ, A´SÞ→ PK´AS /SK´AS . If the
secret attributes of a CPS entity are changed, then all the keys
need to be updated. The key update procedure will start by
regenerating the partial public/secret PKAS /SKAS key pair.
In the partial key pair update procedure, Algorithm 4 is exe-
cuted. It takes the updated set of secret attributes AS as input
1: Input: Secret AS set.
2: Output: New partial key pair PKAS /SKAS .
3: Increment the counter c for revoked keys.
4: If the attributes are the same, the previous computations over t attributes are considered.
5: Else, perform calculations for attributes from i = t to t ± 1.
6: Map t ± 1 attribute in AS to Zp using Equation (1) and compute secret number s´.
s´ = s´ + st±1:ð13Þ
7: Next, compute s using Equation (3).
8: Next, compute public key component Pi for i = t ± 1 attribute using Equation (4).
Algorithm 4: Partial key pair update.
1: Input: Shared AK attribute set.
2: Output: New final public key PKAK .
3: If the attributes are the same, the previous computations over t attributes are considered.
4: Else, perform calculations for attributes from i = t to t ± 1.
5: Map ðt ± 1Þ attribute in shared set AK to Zp. Apply hash function H1 and compute ki using Equation (5). Then, compute k:
k = k + kt±1:ð14Þ
6: Next, compute final public key component Ui, for ðt ± 1Þ attribute using Equation (7).
Algorithm 5: Final public key update.
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and generates a new PK´AK /SK´AK partial key pair for the CPS
device. Subsequently, the final public and secret keys are also
regenerated.
3.4.7. Final Key Update ðPK´AS /A´KÞ→ PK´AK /SK´AK . If the
shared attributes of a CPS device are updated, then the final
public and secret keys need to be regenerated. In this case,
Algorithms 5 and 6 are executed to generate the new final
public and secret keys of the Fog-CPS entities. These algo-
rithms take the updated set of shared attributes A´S as input
and generate the new final public and secret keys P
K´AK /SK´AK of the CPS device.
3.4.8. KeyRevoke. Similar to existing ABE schemes, the keys
are revoked by the CA but in our application scenario FA.
However, the keys can also be revoked due to the malicious
behaviour of CPS devices. Three cases for key revocation
have been identified:
(1) Legitimate revoke: in the first case, both key pairs
can be revoked due to a system update, expiration
date, and scheduled maintenance of the Fog-CPS
system.
(2) Malicious activity: in the second case, the key revoca-
tion may take place due to the malicious behaviour
which might be observed and/or reported by FA,
1: Input:PKAK , M, andℙ, ℙ ⊆AK .
2: Output:CT = fℙ,Um,i, C1, Cr , Cmg.
3: Create a random number c ∈ f0, 1glr and compute
rm =H1ðℙ,M, cÞ, ð16Þ
km = KDFðrmPÞ, ð17Þ
where KDF is a key derivation function which takes the new elliptic curve point rmP and generates a secret key km.
4: Let SP = b1b2 ⋯ :bt be the access policy string. Compute the corresponding ðt − 1Þ degree at most polynomial function f ðx, SPÞ in
Zp½x as
f ðx, SPÞ =
Qt
i=1ðx +H1ðiÞÞ1−bi :ð18Þ
Let ci denote the coefficient of x
i in the polynomial f ðx, SPÞ.
5: Choose two one-way collision resistance hash functions, H2 and H3, defined as:
H2∶f0, 1g∗→ f0, 1glr ,
H3∶f0, 1g∗→ f0, 1glm ,
where lr is the length of a random string, lm is the length of message M, f0, 1g∗ is a binary string of arbitrary length, and f0, 1gl is a
binary string of length l. The length of the hash value is the same as the length of a random string r, and similarly, the hash value will be
the same size as the message M.
6: Next, the CT which consists of three components C1, Cr , and Cm is computed. C1 is a point on the elliptic curve which is computed
from the polynomial f ðx, SPÞ and Ui components in PKAK corresponding to attributes in ℙ. C1 is computed as follows:
Um,i = rmUi, i = 1, 2,⋯, t − jℙj, ð19Þ
C1 = rm∑ti=0ciUi = rmf ðα,ℙÞP:ð20Þ
Next, Cr is computed by a XOR operation on km and c computed in Step 3.
Cr =H2ðkmÞ ⊕ c:ð21Þ
Lastly, Cm is computed by a XOR operation on c and message M.
Cm =H3ðcÞ ⊕M:ð22Þ
Algorithm 7: Encryption.
1: Input: Shared AK attribute set.
2: Output: New final secret key SKAK .
3: If the attributes are the same, the previous computations over t attributes are considered.
4: Else, perform calculations for attributes from i = t to t ± 1.
5: Compute secret number α using Equation (8).
6: Next, compute f ðα,AKÞ:
f ðα,AKÞ = f ðα,AKÞ · ðα +H1ðt ± 1ÞÞ1−at±1 ,ð15Þ
where polynomial f ðα,AKÞ has been computed over t attributes in Equation (9).
7: Pick two random numbers ru, tu ∈ ZP and then compute su using Equation (10).
8: Next, compute secret key component u1 using Equation (11).
Algorithm 6: Final secret key update.
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fog nodes, and CPS devices. Two cases of malicious
activity are considered below:
(a) Malicious FA: the compromise of partial key pair
would not trigger key revocation.
(b) Malicious CPS devices: the compromise of a CPS
device would trigger revocation of the partial key
pair. For example, if the secret key is compro-
mised or leaked, then again keys should be
revoked and regenerated.
(3) Attribute update: in the third case, the change in the
attribute set can trigger a key revocation.
In key revocation, FA revokes the existing partial key pair
and generates new keys in the first two cases, i.e., legitimate
revoke and malicious activity. In the third case, the keys are
regenerated as discussed in Sections 3.4.6 and 3.4.7. As the
generation of final public and secret key is dependent upon
the partial key pair generated over secret attributes, so the
revocation of partial key pair requires the revocation of final
public and secret keys. As a result, Algorithms 4–6 are
designed. The proposed key update algorithms are light-
weight as each revocation only incurs the overhead of one
extra key component. In each subsequent key update, the t
attribute counter is incremented by one.
3.4.9. Correctness. The correctness of the Fog-CPS security
scheme is based on the following property. For a given pair
of final keys ðPKAK , SKAK Þ and CT generated from Encrypt
ðPKAK ,M,ℙÞ, the decryption algorithm Decrypt ðCT,ℙ,
SKAK ,AKÞ will output the correct M, if ℙ ⊆AK ; otherwise,
the decryption will fail.
3.5. Fog-CPS Security Scheme Application Scenario. The pro-
posed scheme can be applied to any Fog-CPS scenario. To
demonstrate it, a case in a fog-enabled smart grid power con-
trol (Fog-SGC) system is considered wherein a smart home
device reports meter data D to a neighbouring area network
(NAN) device. Figure 2 illustrates the communication
between smart home device, NAN device, and FA. The inter-
action between all other entities in a Fog-SGC system would
be similar as between smart home and NAN devices. Initially,
all entities, namely, smart meters and fog nodes, register with
FA based on their secret attribute sets AS. The FA executes
Algorithm 1 to generate their partial key pair. Subsequently,
the FA publishes the public key PKAS and securely transmits
the secret key SKAS to the device.
After registration with FA, the smart home device sends a
data store request to the NAN device. Upon receiving the
request, the NAN device asks for a set of shared attributes
AK . Subsequently, the smart home device generates the final
public key of the NAN device by executing Algorithm 2.
Next, the NAN device executes Algorithm 3 to generate the
final secret key SKAK corresponding to the shared attribute
set. Then, the smart home device encrypts D using the final
public key PKAK of the NAN device and signs the shared
attributes AK using its secret key SKAK . Subsequently, the
smart home device sends CT and signature σ to the NAN
device. Following this, the NAN device verifies the σ and
decrypts the CT. Upon successful decryption, it gets an assur-
ance that the smart home device possesses the required
attributes and stores D.
4. Theoretical Security Analysis and Evaluation
As mentioned in the previous sections, in the proposed Fog-
CPS security scheme, each entity possesses two key pairs,
namely, partial and secret. So keeping that in view, the secu-
rity of the proposed scheme is carefully analyzed to ensure
security against the following attacks:
(i) Computing the final secret key SKAK from the partial
secret key SKAS
Smart home device wants to report meter data D
NAN device asks for a set of attributes 𝔸K
Smart home device generates final public key PK𝔸K
of NAN device
NAN device
NAN device generated its final
secret key SK𝔸K
Smart home device verifies
the signature and decrypts D
NAN device
Smart home
device
Fog assist (FA)
1. 3.
2.
Entity registration based on
Generate partial key pair
Publish partial public keys
𝔸S
PK𝔸S/SK𝔸S
PK𝔸S
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
Smart home device encrypts D with final public key PK𝔸K
Smart home device signs shared attributes 𝔸K and D
Smart home device sends ciphertext and signature to NAN device
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
Figure 2: Fog-CPS scheme application.
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(ii) Computing the partial/final secret keys from the
partial/final public keys
(iii) Computing the final secret key SKAK from multiple
ciphertexts (i.e., chosen ciphertext attack)
The Fog-CPS scheme is secure against the abovemen-
tioned attacks due to the q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-
DHI) problem [13], elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP), and the robustness of the hash functions.
Additionally, the robustness of the proposed scheme is
based on two fundamental security notions of encryption
schemes, namely, indistinguishability of messages and the
collision resistance against secret keys. Message indistin-
guishability is an important security property of many
encryption schemes. Given the ciphertext and the encryption
key, the adversary cannot tell apart two same-length but dif-
ferent messages encrypted under the scheme, even if he chose
the messages himself. With collision resistance, the attackers
cannot pool their secret key components corresponding to a
set of attributes to generate a new key which otherwise
cannot be generated from their own attributes. Before pre-
senting the security analysis against the abovementioned
attacks, the notion of collision resistance as presumed in this
scheme is discussed.
4.1. Collision Resistance against Secret Keys. The proposed
scheme does not follow the same conventional attribute shar-
ing as the existing ABE schemes. Attributes are only shared
between two CPS devices and the FA node. So, the collision
attack as presumed in existing schemes does not apply in this
case. In other words, the pooling of attributes and secret key
components (i.e., the collision attack) from several adver-
saries who do not share the attributes would not benefit
in generating the secret keys. Precisely, for the security
of the proposed scheme, the definition of collision resis-
tance is modified.
In this case, it is essential to prevent a device from gener-
ating the final secret key SKAK of another device.
Theorem 1. It can be shown by a reduction that the computa-
tional problem in the proposed scheme is at least as hard as the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
Proof. Assume A is an algorithm that efficiently solves our
problem. We can use A to compute the discrete logarithm
of an element h to the base g as follows:
(i) Invoke A on input m = g and m´ = h
(ii) A will return will return r, s, and t such that rs ≡ g
and rt ≡ h modulo p
(iii) Now we can compute a number x such that x · s ≡
1ðmod GÞ (this can be done efficiently using the
extended Euclidean algorithm because p is prime
and therefore s and p are coprime)
(iv) Then, gðx:tÞ ≡ ðrsÞx · t ≡ ðrðx:sÞt ≡ rt ≡ hðmod GÞÞ
(v) Hence, x · t is the discrete logarithm of h to the base g
(vi) Note that the discrete logarithm problem is at least
as hard as our problem since if you can compute dis-
crete logarithms to some base r, you can s and t for
given m and m´ such that rs ≡m and rt ≡m modulo
G. Hence, the two problems are equally hard under
the assumption that r is of order p.
4.2. Key Generation Analysis. In this section, the difficulty of
deriving the partial/final secret keys from their respective
public keys and final secret key derivation from multiple
ciphertexts and partial secret key is analyzed. Additionally,
the computational difficulty of guessing the attributes and
subsequently generating the secret keys is also discussed.
4.2.1. Partial/Final Secret Key Guessing. The partial and final
secret keys in Algorithms 1 and 3 are generated based on the
secret and shared attributes which are mapped to Zp. The
success probability of guessing an attribute is equivalent to
the complexity of hashing algorithm H1, i.e., 2n/2 (birthday
paradox). For the partial secret key SKAS , the adversary
should guess all attributes in set AS and the secret random
number r. The secret numbers si which are used in partial
key pair generation cannot be derived by collision attack
due to its complexity. To be precise, the computational com-
plexity is of the order of number of attributes for hash func-
tion and random guessing. This also applies to final public
and secret key generation algorithms whereby the shared
attributes are hashed and subsequently used in key genera-
tion. Additionally, the assumption that each entity possesses
a unique set of secret and shared attributes with no overlap
with the attribute set of other entities makes attribute guess-
ing more difficult.
4.2.2. Partial/Final Secret Key Generation. The partial secret
key SKAS of a CPS device cannot be guessed due to the diffi-
culty of deriving the secret key components si ∈AS and r ∈ Zp
in Algorithm 1. So, in order to generate/guess the final secret
key, the adversary needs to know the secret key SKAS ,
shared attribute set AK , and three secret numbers α, ru,
tu. α is computed from the secret components s and k in
algorithm 3.4.2 whereas ru, tu are random numbers. The
secret component s can only be computed and/or known
if both the FA node and the CPS device are compromised.
The compromised device can leak the shared attribute set
and the final secret key SKAK .
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is secure against an adver-
sary A with knowledge of the shared attribute set AK for
deriving the final SKAK secret key by collision attack.
Proof. Having the knowledge of AK is not enough for gener-
ating the SKAK = u1, where
u1 = su − rutu mod pð Þ: ð23Þ
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From Equation (10) in Algorithm 3,
1
f α,AKð Þ
= su − rutu mod pð Þ, ð24Þ
where ru and tu are random numbers. The condition in
Equation (24) only holds if su and α are known, and subse-
quently, the values of rutu can be computed. All these values
can then be used to solve Equation (23). Another solution to
Equation (23) is to correctly guess the random numbers ru, tu
and compute α. The difficulty of computing α is already
explained in preceding paragraphs. Hence, generating SKAK
without knowing secret components ðru, tuÞ, su, and α is
computationally infeasible for an adversary.
4.2.3. Computing the Secret Keys from Public Keys. It is under-
lined that the secret keys, either partial or final, cannot be
computed from their respective public keys due to the intrac-
tability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP). Given two points P,Q ∈ EðFqÞ, the ECDLP prob-
lem is to find an integer x, if it exists, such that Q = xP. Fol-
lowing the same notion, the problem is to compute
partial/final secret SKAS /SKAK keys from public keys PKAS /
PKAK . Like in case of SKAS , given the PKAS = fPi = siPg for
all attributes inAS, the problem is to compute s
i from its cor-
responding public key Pi component. The ECDLP problem
has to be solved for all attributes in a given attribute set.
The same applies to the final secret key SKAK generation from
PKAK . For the SKAK , ECDLP is to compute ki from given Ui
and Pi. To be precise, due to the intractability of ECDLP, it is
not feasible to compute secret keys from public keys.
4.2.4. Computing the Decryption Key from Ciphertext. Addi-
tionally, the proposed scheme is secure against an adversary
for deriving the decryption key rmP from the ciphertext
CT = fℙ,Um,i, K1m, Cσm, Cmg.
Theorem 3. Given the ciphertext CT = fℙ,Um,i, K1m, C1, Cr
, Cmg, it is hard to compute decryption key rmP.
Proof. A ciphertext CT corresponding to the access policy ℙ
consists of the following parameters:
Um,i = rmPi, i = 1, 2,⋯, n − ℙj j,
C1 = rm〠
n
i=0
f iUi = rmf α,ℙð ÞP,
Cr =H2 kmð Þ ⊕ c,
Cm =H3 cð Þ ⊕M: ð25Þ
Since ∑n−jℙji=1 Um,i = rmð f ðα,ℙÞ − f0ÞP, it is hard to com-
pute rmP using C1 due to the difficulty of solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem. Given Um,i = rmUi = rmk
Pi, i = 1, 2,⋯, q = n − jℙj, this problem can be reduced to
the ðq − 1Þ‐DHI problem as follows. Let Q = αrmP. The
parameters are then rewritten Um,i = rmUi = αirmP as Qi =
Um,i = αi−1Q, i = 1, 2,⋯, q. This implies that if an adversary
A has the ability to solve the ðq − 1Þ‐DHI problem, he/she
can compute the key rmP = ð1/αÞQ1 = ð1/αÞQ and then suc-
cessfully decrypt the ciphertext CT. The following theorem
proves that solving the ðq − 1Þ‐DHI problem is as hard as
the q‐GDH problem.
Remark 1. From the above discussion, the proposed scheme
is collision resistant against secret keys. As a result, comput-
ing the key km = rmP from a ciphertext CT corresponding to
the access policy ℙ without a valid user secret key SKAK is as
hard as the q −GDH problem. This implies that given
fUm,1,Um,2,⋯,Um,q, C1g, where q = n − jℙj, T ∈G, the q −
GDH problem reduces to the ðq − 1Þ −DHI problem and
then decides whether T is equal to rmP or a random element
in G. But as the q −GDH problem is hard to solve, so would
be ðq − 1Þ −DHI. Hence, an adversary cannot derive rmP
from C1.
4.3. Network Devices Compromise Analysis.Having discussed
the difficulty of generating and/or guessing the secret keys,
the impact of the compromise of Fog-CPS entities on the
proposed security scheme is discussed.
4.3.1. Compromise of FA. The compromise of FA can have
drastic impact on the security of the Fog-CPS system. A com-
promised FA can reveal the partial secret keys SKAS of Fog-
CPS entities. An adversary in possession of a partial secret
key SKAS and the shared attribute set AK can generate the
corresponding final secret key SKAK . After having generated
the final secret key, the adversary can also change the
attributes agreed with FA and subsequently further com-
promise the network. However, if the adversary is not
aware of the shared attribute set, then it cannot generate
the final secret key. Moreover, the actual encryption and
decryption is performed using final public and secret keys
PKAK /SKAK meaning that the communication between the
CPS devices is still secure.
4.3.2. Compromise of CPS Device and Fog Nodes (Leakage of
Final Secret Key). The compromise of CPS devices and fog
nodes will only leak their own secret keys. The compromise
of one set of secret keys does not risk the messages encrypted
under different shared attributes therefore keys. Henceforth,
legitimate CPS devices can still communicate securely.
5. Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, its
algorithmic efficiency in terms of processing time and
memory complexity is measured.
5.1. System Configurations. For benchmarking the time
complexity, two sets of experiments are conducted to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on both
resource-limited CPS devices and resourceful fog nodes. In
the first experiment, the scheme is evaluated on a Raspberry
Pi 3B+ model (CPS devices). It has a Quad Core 1.2GHz,
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64-bit CPU, 1GB of RAM, a wireless LAN and Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) on board, 100 Base Ethernet, 40-pin
extended GPIO, 4 USB ports, HDMI, and micro SD port.
In the second experiment, it is executed on a virtual machine
running Ubuntu R16.04 with Python 3.6.4. on Intel (R)
Core(TM) i5-4310U CPU@2.000GHz with 8.0GB RAM
(fog nodes).
5.2. Implementation and Evaluation. The Fog-CPS scheme is
compared with five other ABE schemes in Guo et al. [6],
Odelu and Das [8], Cheng et al. [12], Yamada et al. [14],
and Zhou et al. [9] using the Charm crypto library [15]. All
security schemes, including this, are based on a selective
security model. It is noted that the proposed scheme is not
based on bilinear elliptic curves and can be implemented
on any elliptic curve. However, in order to compare the
scheme with existing ABE schemes which are based on bilin-
ear maps, it is implemented on bilinear curves, i.e., MNT159
and SS512. On other curves, namely, prime192v1 and
secp224r1, the memory overhead would be less. The proposed
scheme and two others in Guo et al. [6] and Odelu and Das [8]
are tested on a non-super-singular asymmetric bilinear curve
(i.e., MNT159), whilst three of the schemes [9, 12, 14] have
been tested on the super-singular SS512 curve. Both SS512
and MNT159 curves provide 80-bit security.
5.3. Timing Results. The execution times of all algorithms are
benchmarked to compare the efficiency of different schemes.
In the existing schemes in Guo et al. [6], Odelu and Das [8],
Cheng et al. [12], Yamada et al. [14], and Zhou et al. [9], the
Setup and KeyGen algorithms are separate. But, since there is
no Setup in the Fog-CPS scheme, the execution time of both
Table 4: Processing times (sec) ðU = 20Þ:
Schemes Setup+KeyGen (final KeyGen) Encrypt (1 kB) Decrypt (1 kB) Encrypt (1MB) Decrypt (1MB)
First experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.32 0.15 0.62 184.29 740.01
Odelu and Das [8] 0.36 0.31 0.08 377.4 105.8
Cheng et al. [12] 0.68 0.24 0.37 275.4 416.5
Yamada et al. [14] 1.16 1.55 1.84 1595.2 1822.3
Zhou et al. [9] 0.19 0.12 0.94 153.9 1123.7
Fog-CPS scheme 0.06 0.24 0.04 253.2 43.28
Second experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.034 0.02 0.05 24.49 63.09
Odelu and Das [8] 0.05 0.09 0.02 99.21 27.87
Cheng et al. [12] 0.09 0.04 0.03 36.85 34.88
Yamada et al. [14] 0.41 0.88 0.38 911.76 383.99
Zhou et al. [9] 0.08 0.02 0.11 20.18 119.57
Fog-CPS scheme 0.017 0.06 0.011 65.47 11.26
Table 3: Processing times (sec) ðU = 10Þ.
Schemes Setup+KeyGen (final KeyGen) Encrypt (1 kB) Decrypt (1 kB) Encrypt (1MB) Decrypt (1MB)
First experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.27 0.15 0.59 175.09 696.16
Odelu and Das [8] 0.18 0.30 0.08 326.7 91.9
Cheng et al. [12] 0.36 0.18 0.31 212.3 367.5
Yamada et al. [14] 0.63 1.54 1.83 1547.5 1838.3
Zhou et al. [9] 0.13 0.12 0.94 153.2 1118.5
Fog-CPS scheme 0.02 0.20 0.035 252.2 43.11
Second experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.034 0.02 0.05 24.21 62.65
Odelu and Das [8] 0.03 0.09 0.02 96.71 27.28
Cheng et al. [12] 0.05 0.03 0.02 34.89 32.58
Yamada et al. [14] 0.23 0.56 0.26 564.66 288.43
Zhou et al. [9] 0.05 0.20 0.12 20.21 119.75
Fog-CPS scheme 0.008 0.06 0.01 65.29 11.14
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these algorithms is added and compared with the timing of
the final public and secret key generation. To be precise, the
final key pair generation timing of this scheme is the sum
of the execution times of Algorithms 2 and 3.
For Setup and KeyGen, three different sizes of attribute
universe U and user attribute sets A are considered. To be
precise, an attribute universe U of 10, 20, and 30 attributes
has been implemented for measuring the timing of the Setup
algorithm. Likewise, for the secret key generation, a user
attribute set A of 5, 15, and 25 attributes is taken into
consideration.
Additionally, the encryption and decryption algorithms
are also implemented to demonstrate that they are more effi-
cient than the ones in Odelu and Das [8] because this scheme
uses lesser elliptic curve group elements. Another reason to
implement the encryption and decryption algorithms was
to measure their execution timings on the Raspberry Pi, i.e.,
CPS devices. Henceforth, two types of benchmarks are set
for measuring the times for encryption and decryption: (1)
1 kilobyte (1 kB) and (2) 1 megabyte (1MB). These two low
size messages are used because CPS devices and cloud
requests are usually transmitted in low size messages. Fur-
thermore, in the encryption algorithm, an access policy ℙ
of constant size, i.e., 5 attributes, is considered. For the key
update, there are two cases with an increment and decrement
of one attribute, i.e., t ± 1. However, in our experimental eval-
uation, the execution time for key update is recorded in case
of t + 1 attributes only.
Tables 3–5 list the processing times of all algorithms for
the first and second experiments for attribute U of 10, 20,
and 30, respectively. Additionally, graphs (see Figures 3–10)
are also plotted for the results of the first experiment.
5.3.1. First Experiment. In this experiment, our implementa-
tions are carried out on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ model. Timing
results are shown in Figures 3–10. From Figure 3, it can be
observed that the Fog-CPS scheme takes 0.02 sec for the final
key pair generation over 10 attributes, 0.06 sec over 20 attri-
butes, and 0.10 sec over 30 attributes. Additionally, Figure 4
shows the partial key pair generation timings and
Figures 5 and 6 show the final and partial key pair update
timings of the Fog-CPS scheme. It can be observed that
key pair update timings of this scheme are negligible due
to the lightweight and efficient process. Figures 7 and 8
show the timings of encryption; this scheme takes 0.20
and 252.3 sec to encrypt a message of 1 kB and 1MB, respec-
tively. Similarly, for decrypting a ciphertext of 1 kB and
1MB, it takes 0.03 sec and 43.1 sec as shown in Figures 9
and 10, respectively.
5.3.2. Second Experiment. In the second experiment, the
implementations are executed on a desktop computer (con-
figurations are mentioned in Section 5.1). Tables 3–5 list
the timing results of the final key pair generation, encryption,
decryption, and key pair updates. Overall, it is observed that
benchmarks recorded on the Raspberry Pi 3B+ model are
slower than on the desktop computer. Comparing the tim-
ings of both experiments in Table 3, it is noted that the
proposed scheme is slower on the Raspberry Pi. But it is still
the fastest compared to the rest of the schemes as it only takes
0.008, 0.017, and 0.02 seconds for an attribute universe of 10,
20, and 30 attributes, respectively.
Analyzing the processing times for encryption of 1 kB
and 1MB messages, it can be observed that the encryption
timing of the schemes by Zhou et al. [9] and Yamada et al.
[14] is almost equal and they are faster than rest of the
schemes, followed by the scheme of Cheng et al. [12].
The Fog-CPS scheme is three times slower whereas the
scheme by Odelu and Das [8] is four times slower than the
schemes by Zhou et al. [9] and Guo et al. [6]. Likewise, the
Fog-CPS security scheme is 10 times faster than the scheme
by Yamada et al. [14] which is the slowest of all schemes.
Comparing the timings of encryption and decryption, it is
observed that in the case of encryption, the proposed scheme
is a bit slower than three of the other schemes. However, in
decryption, this scheme is the fastest of all; it takes only
Table 5: Processing times (sec) ðU = 30Þ:
Schemes Setup+KeyGen (final KeyGen) Encrypt (1 kB) Decrypt (1 kB) Encrypt (1MB) Decrypt (1MB)
First experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.37 0.16 0.68 186.78 740.01
Odelu and Das [8] 0.52 0.32 0.09 375.0 105.61
Cheng et al. [12] 1.0 0.31 0.42 361.21 515.24
Yamada et al. [14] 1.69 1.55 1.84 1533.4 1838.8
Zhou et al. [9] 0.31 0.15 1.10 154.2 1128.2
Fog-CPS scheme 0.10 0.24 0.04 253.7 43.28
Second experiment
Guo et al. [6] 0.045 0.02 0.05 24.49 63.09
Odelu and Das [8] 0.07 0.08 0.02 97.64 27.97
Cheng et al. [12] 0.11 0.04 0.03 39.84 36.10
Yamada et al. [14] 0.62 1.38 0.59 1330.16 580.92
Zhou et al. [9] 0.10 0.02 0.11 20.18 119.57
Fog-CPS scheme 0.027 0.06 0.01 65.76 12.92
12 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
0.01 seconds for encryption of the 1 kB message. Following
the same trend as in encryption, the scheme by Yamada
et al. [14] is the slowest of all the other schemes in decryption
as well. Furthermore, it can be observed that for decryption
of the 1 kB message, the execution time of the scheme by
Odelu and Das [8] is almost equal to that by Cheng et al. [12].
5.4. Memory Overhead. Table 6 shows the calculation of the
memory overhead of each scheme. In the MNT159 curve,
one group element in G and G1 takes 2× 160= 320 bits
whereas one group element in GT takes 2 × 512 = 1024 bits.
Likewise, in the SS512 curve, one group element in G1 takes
2× 512=1024 bits whereas one group element in GT takes 2
× 1024 = 2048 bits.
The column Bytes represents the total number of bytes
required in all algorithms (i.e., Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
Decrypt, and KeyRevoke) for an attribute universe U of 10
and an access policy ℙ of 5 attributes. In the case of the pro-
posed scheme, the memory overhead of one partial and final
key pair generation and one key update in both cases is also
considered when calculating the number of bytes required
by each algorithm.
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The proposed Fog-CPS scheme is lightweight than the
Odelu and Das [8] scheme as it requires fewer elliptic curve
group elements. Our scheme requires 2ðn + 1Þ elements in
G for generation of both partial and final public keys whereas
the scheme by Odelu and Das [8] requires 3ðn + 1Þ elements
for the public key. Likewise, for partial and final secret keys,
our scheme requires only two secret elements in the finite
field Zp, whereas the scheme by Odelu and Das [8] requires
three. The length of CT in our scheme is ðn − jℙj + 2Þ group
G elements whereas ðn − jℙj + 3Þ in the scheme by Odelu
and Das [8].
As can be seen in Table 6, the Fog-CPS scheme has the
lowest memory overhead, i.e., 1340 bytes followed by the
Guo et al. [6] and Odelu and Das [8] schemes which take
1636 and 1760 bytes, respectively. The Zhou et al. [9] scheme
incurs the highest overhead of 9876 bytes. It is noted that for
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the proposed scheme, the memory overhead of one final pub-
lic and secret key over a shared attribute set ðjAkj = 10Þ has
also been considered. Moreover, for the Setup and KeyGen
algorithms, i.e., partial key pair generation in this case, the
Fog-CPS scheme has the lowest overhead compared to all
other schemes. The final secret key in the proposed scheme
only requires one element of the order of base point on the
elliptic curve G.
In the Guo et al. [6] scheme, there are ð2n + 1Þ elements
in G1 and one in GT for PK, two elements in G1 for SK,
and ðn − jℙj + 2Þ elements in G1 for CT. In the Zhou et al.
[9] scheme, there are ð6n + 1ÞG1 and ð2jAj + 1Þ group ele-
ments in PK and SK, respectively, whereas CT has 2 group
elements in G1 and one in GT . The PK in the Cheng et al.
[12] scheme has 2n elements in G1 and two in GT ; the SK
has jAj + 1 elements in G1, whereas the CT has 2 elements
in G1 and one in GT . In the Yamada et al. [14] scheme, PK
contains 6 elements in G1 and one in GT , SK contains ð4jAj
+ 2Þ elements in G1, and CT contains 3ðjℙj + 1Þ in G1. The
Zhou et al. [9] scheme has the highest memory overhead
followed by the Cheng et al. [12] and Yamada et al. [14]
schemes. Both the Zhou et al. [9] and Cheng et al. [12]
schemes have constant size ciphertexts which only require 2
group elements in G1 and one element in GT . The CT in
the Fog-CPS scheme and the Guo et al. [6] scheme have
almost the same number of elements. In the key update
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Algorithms 4–6, this scheme only requires 2 elements inG and
2 elements of the order of base point on the elliptic curve G.
5.5. Computational Overhead. The computational overhead
of all schemes is summarized in Table 7. The column Total
operations represents the total number of operations by con-
sidering all algorithms, i.e., Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and
Decrypt. In the proposed scheme, the computational over-
head of one partial and final key pair generation and update
are also considered. From Table 7, it is observed that the Fog-
CPS scheme introduces the lowest computational overhead
than all other schemes which are based on bilinear maps
and elliptic curves.
For partial and final public key generation, the Fog-CPS
scheme requires ð2n + 2Þ scalar multiplications in the elliptic
curve groupG. Likewise, for Encrypt andDecrypt, ðn − ℙ + 1Þ
and ðn −ℙ + 2Þ scalar point multiplications are required,
respectively. Moreover, in the key update algorithms, i.e., 4,
5, and 6, this scheme only requires two scalar multiplications.
For the Setup and KeyGen algorithms, the Guo et al. [6]
scheme requires ð2n + 2Þ exponentiations and 1 pairing
operation, respectively. In addition, the Encrypt algorithm
requires ðn − jℙj + 3Þ exponentiations and a single pairing
whereas Decrypt requires ð2jn − ℙj + 4Þ exponentiations
and 4 pairing operations. The Setup and KeyGen algorithms
in the Zhou et al. [9] scheme require 6n + 1 and ð2jAj + 1Þ
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Figure 9: Processing time (sec) for decryption algorithm (1 kB).
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Figure 10: Processing time (sec) for decryption algorithm (1MB).
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exponentiation operations, respectively. Similarly, for
Encrypt, it requires 3 exponentiations and 1 pairing, whereas
forDecrypt, ð2jℙj + 1Þ exponentiation and pairing operations
are required. Moreover, for the Setup and KeyGen algo-
rithms, the Cheng et al. [12] scheme requires ðn + jAjÞ expo-
nentiation and n pairing operations. On the contrary, it
requires 3 exponentiation and 2 pairing operations for the
Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms, respectively. In the Yamada
et al. [14] scheme, ð4jAj + 3Þ exponentiations are required
for both the Setup and KeyGen algorithms. However, the
Encrypt algorithm requires ð3jℙj + 1Þ exponentiations and
Decrypt requires 2jℙj exponentiation and pairing operations.
6. Conclusion
The security and privacy challenges posed by Fog-CPS sys-
tems can affect both individuals and systems. The heteroge-
neous nature of CPS devices with varying degrees of
computation and storage capacity also make it a challenging
task to devise the security solutions. It is therefore essential to
find lightweight solutions which eliminate the need for
applying different security mechanisms at different layers of
Fog-CPS. Moreover, the devised schemes must also enable
the users/CPS devices to have control over their data without
risking their privacy of information (e.g., identities, location,
data, and type of service used) with other entities, such as the
fog nodes and/or cloud provider. The existing PKE and ABE
schemes are computationally expensive and, therefore, not
suitable for resource-constrained devices. Moreover, the
sharing of attributes with the FA risks the privacy of CPS
devices as it can also decrypt the messages. Considering the
limitations of existing schemes, in this paper, a lightweight
encryption scheme is proposed. In the Fog-CPS scheme, the
CPS devices generate the keys without relying on a FA. In
our proposed security scheme, the above problems are
addressed by dividing the attribute set into secret and shared
attributes. The secret attributes are used for entity registra-
tion with FA, whereas the shared attributes are only shared
with the collaborating CPS devices and employed to generate
the final public and secret keys. The compromise of FA
would not endanger the secrecy of messages among CPS
devices, as they can still securely communicate. Furthermore,
the key update process of the proposed scheme is very light-
weight, since the key generation process as found in Algo-
rithms 1–3 is not repeated.
Another novel aspect of the Fog-CPS scheme is that it is
based on elliptic curve cryptography which supports smaller
key sizes and is highly suitable for resource-constrained CPS
devices. The experimental evaluation shows that the Fog-
CPS security scheme outperforms other ABE schemes based
on bilinear pairing and elliptic curves. In the future, the
authors will investigate how the proposed scheme can be fur-
ther improved to support more expressive access structures
and an adaptive security model.
Table 6: Memory overhead.
Schemes Setup KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt Key update Bytes
Fog-CPS scheme PKAS = n + 1ð ÞG SKAS = 1 ×O Pð Þ n − ℙj j + 2ð ÞG M 2 ×O Pð Þ + 2G 1340
Odelu and Das [8] PK = 3n + 1ð ÞG SK = 2 ×O Pð Þ n ℙj j + 3ð ÞG + L M N/A 1760
Guo et al. [6]
PK = 2n + 1ð ÞG1 +GT
MSK =G1
SK = 2G1 n − ℙj j + 2ð ÞG1 +GT M N/A 1636
Zhou et al. [9]
PK = 6n + 1ð ÞG1
MSK = 2Zp
SK = 2 Aj j + 1ð ÞG1 2G1 +GT M N/A 9876
Yamada et al. [14]
PK = 6G1 +GT
MSK = 2Zp
SK = 4 Aj j + 2ð ÞG1 3 ℙj j + 1ð ÞG1 M N/A 6292
Cheng et al. [12]
PK = 2nG1 + 2GT
MSK = 2nG1
SK = Aj j + 1ð ÞG1 2G1 +GT GT N/A 6932
Note: G1 and GT : prime order pairing groups (160 bits); exp: exponent operation; €p: pairing operation; jAj and jℙj: no. of attributes in secret key and access
policy; G: elliptic curve group defined over finite field Zp; OðPÞ: order of the base point (160 bits in Zp); L: length of plaintext message M.
Table 7: Computational overhead.
Schemes Setup KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt KeyRevoke Total operations
Fog-CPS scheme n + 1ð Þecm N/A n − ℙ + 1ð Þecm n − ℙ + 2ð Þecm 2ecm 37ecm
Odelu and Das [8] 3 n + 1ð Þecm N/A n − ℙ + 2ð Þecm n − ℙ + 3ð Þecm N/A 48ecm
Guo et al. [6] 2nð Þ exp + €p 2 exp n − ℙj j + 3ð Þ exp + €p 2 n −ℙj j + 4ð Þ exp + 4€p N/A 44 exp + 6€p
Zhou et al. [9] 6n + 1ð Þ exp 2 Aj j + 1ð Þ exp 3 exp + €p 2 ℙj j + 1ð Þ exp + 2 ℙj j + 1ð Þ€p N/A 96 exp + 12€p
Yamada et al. [14] 1 exp 4 Aj j + 2ð Þ exp 3 ℙj j + 1ð Þ exp 2 ℙj j exp + 2 ℙj j€p N/A 69 exp + 10€p
Cheng et al. [12] n exp + n€p Aj j exp 3 exp 2€p N/A 23 exp + 12€p
Note: exp: exponentiation operation; €p: pairing operation; ecm: scalar point multiplication in the elliptic curve group G.
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